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Abstract: Universities and other educational organizations are adopting computer and Internet-based assessment tools
(herein called e-exams) to reach widespread audiences. While this makes examination tests more accessible, it
exposes them to new threats. At present, there are very few strategies to check such systems for security, also
there is a lack of formal security definitions in this domain. This paper fills this gap: in the formal framework
of the applied pi-calculus, we define several fundamental authentication and privacy properties and establish
the first theoretical framework for the security analysis of e-exam protocols. As proof of concept we analyze
two of such protocols with ProVerif. The first “secure electronic exam system” proposed in the literature turns
out to have several severe problems. The second protocol, called Remark!, is proved to satisfy all the security
properties assuming access control on the bulletin board. We propose a simple protocol modification that
removes the need of such assumption though guaranteeing all the security properties.
1 INTRODUCTION
Electronic exams (in short, e-exams) are
computer-based systems employed to assess the
skills, the capabilities or the knowledge of students
and professionals. Their importance has raised
considerably since several educational and testing
institutions began to offer e-exams as a service open
to a worldwide-spread audience. For instance, univer-
sities like MIT, Stanford and Berkeley have set them
up in Massive Open Online Course (MOOC). Stu-
dents can be marked online, although not yet granted
with a legally valid diploma. Other institutions
employ e-exams to grant students with certificates
which have an officially recognized validity. This
happens, for instance, with testing organizations like
ETS2, the world leader in the business of assessing
content-knowledge and abilities in various subjects.
Other examples are CISCO and Microsoft’s career
certification programs, and ECDL, the pioneer in
assessing people’s computer office skills and in
releasing “European Computer Driving Licence”.
∗This research was conducted with the support of the
Digital trust Chair from the University of Auvergne Foun-
dation.
2https://www.ets.org/
For all these and similar institutes, e-exam sys-
tems are a promise for a better and a cheaper orga-
nization and management of tests: e-exams are flexi-
ble in where and when exams can be set (Hjeltnes and
Hansson, 2005), their test sessions can be easily open
to a very large public of candidates and, if the imple-
mentation allows automatic marking, their results are
immediately available.
So far, the main concern about e-exam secu-
rity has been about student cheating and imperson-
ation (Weippl, 2005). Since such threats mainly come
from students, most institutions have arranged invig-
ilated testing. The invigilator can be a person, like a
lecturer attending at the test location, or a software,
like ProctorU3 running on the candidate’s computer.
A proctor is meant to supervise the test and to detect
and report, perhaps also discourage, any attempt of
fraud. However, e-exams are threatened by more se-
rious problems than student cheating. As evidenced
by recent scandals, dishonest acts can come also from
other parties than candidates, such as bribed exam-
iners or misbehaving exam authorities. The conse-
quences are usually worse in these cases than in those
due to student cheating. In the Atlanta scandal, school
authorities colluded in changing student marks to im-
3http://www.proctoru.com/
prove their institution’s rankings and get more pub-
lic funds (Copeland, 2013). In a BBC investigation,
ETS was shown vulnerable to a fraud perpetrated by
official invigilators: in collusion with all the candi-
dates who were there to get their visas, the invigilators
dictated the correct answers during the test (Watson,
2014).
We keep a neutral position in the debate about
whether e-exams are actually a beneficial and promis-
ing choice in promoting and supporting education, but
it is a fact that the adoption of computer-based assess-
ment is increasing. It is also a fact that such a growth
has not been followed nor was it preceded by a rig-
orous understanding and analysis of security. There
is then a need for a formal framework to define and
analyse the security of e-exam protocols.
Contributions: We present the first formalization
for e-exams, and define several fundamental security
properties for e-exams. We categorize them in two
main classes: (a) authentication properties, includ-
ing Answer Origin Authentication, Form Authorship,
Form Authenticity, and Mark Authenticity, and (b) pri-
vacy properties, containing Question Indistinguisha-
bility, Anonymous Marking, Anonymous Examiner,
Mark Privacy, and Mark Anonymity. We develop our
formal framework in the applied pi-calculus (Abadi
and Fournet, 2001), wherein we propose a model for
the typical e-exam’s processes and phases and define
all our properties.
We validate our approach by analyzing two e-
exam protocols. The first is an internet exam pro-
tocol proposed by Huszti et al. (Huszti and Petho˝,
2010). The second is a recent protocol proposed by
Giustolisi et al. (Giustolisi et al., 2014). We model
both protocols in the applied pi-calculus, and check
them against our properties using ProVerif (Blanchet,
2001; Blanchet et al., 2008). Our security analysis
reveals several weaknesses in the first protocol, even
without considering dishonest parties. We show that
the second protocol is secure if all parties are honest,
and we also consider the situation where some par-
ties are dishonest, i.e., collaborate with the attacker.
In this case we discover a weakness on Form Authen-
ticity, and we propose a simple fix to overcome this
weakness.
Beyond these results, this work is the first theo-
retical framework for the security analysis of e-exams
protocols. It can be generalized in a straightforward
way to study traditional exam protocols.
Related Work: Only a few papers propose e-exam
protocols that guarantee some security, mainly under
the assumption that some authority is trusted (Huszti
and Petho˝, 2010; Castella`-Roca et al., 2006; Herrera-
Joancomartı´ et al., 2004; Bella et al., 2011). Few
other works (Giustolisi et al., 2013; Furnell et al.,
1998; Weippl, 2005) list some relevant properties for
e-exams, yet only informally.
Arapinis et al. (Arapinis et al., 2013) propose
a cloud-based protocol for conference management
system that supports applications, evaluations, and
decisions. They identify and analyze a few privacy
properties (secrecy and unlinkability) that should
hold despite a malicious-but-cautious cloud, and they
prove, using ProVerif, that their protocol satisfy them.
To the best of our knowledge, no formal defi-
nitions have been given for the security properties
of e-exam systems. There are instead papers pre-
senting the formalization and verification of proper-
ties in domains that seem related to e-exams, namely
e-voting (Dreier et al., 2011; Dreier et al., 2012b;
Dreier et al., 2012a; Backes et al., 2008a; Delaune
et al., 2009; Delaune et al., 2006a) and e-auction sys-
tems (Dong et al., 2010; Dreier et al., 2013b; Dreier
et al., 2013a).
Some of the security properties therein studied re-
mind those we are presenting for e-exams. For in-
stance, Answer Origin Authentication is analogous to
voter and bidder authentication. Mark Privacy re-
minds ballot privacy and losing bids privacy. Yet,
there are fundamental differences. In e-exams, An-
swer Authorship should be preserved even in the pres-
ence of colluding candidates. Conversely, vote (bid)
authorship is not a problem for e-voting (e-auction),
in fact unlinkability between a voter (bidder) and her
vote (bid) is a desired property. An other important
property for e-exams is to keep exam questions secret
until the exam ends. We do not find such a property in
e-voting where the candidates are previously known
to the voters, and in e-auction where the goods to bid
for are previously known to the bidders. Moreover,
properties such as Anonymous Marking, meaning that
the examiners do not know whose copy they are grad-
ing, evaluates to a sort of fixed-term anonymity. This
property is meant to hold during the marking, but is
trivially falsified when the marks are assigned to the
candidates.
Outline: In Section 2, we model e-exam protocols
in the applied pi-calculus. Then, we specify secu-
rity properties in Section 3. We validate our frame-
work by analysing the security of two e-exam proto-
cols (Huszti and Petho˝, 2010) and (Giustolisi et al.,
2014) in Section 4 and 5. Finally, in Section 6, we
discuss our results and outline the future work.
2 MODELLING
We model e-exam protocols in the applied pi-
calculus, a process calculus designed for the verifi-
cation of cryptographic protocols. To perform the au-
tomatic protocol verification, we use ProVerif. This
tool uses a process description based on the applied
pi-calculus, but has syntactical extensions and is en-
riched by events to check reachability and correspon-
dence properties. Besides, it can check equivalence
properties. We use events to define various authen-
tication properties, and we model privacy properties
as equivalence properties. Precisely, honest parties
are modeled as processes in the applied pi-calculus.
These processes can exchange messages on public
or private channels, create keys or fresh random val-
ues and perform tests and cryptographic operations,
which are modeled as functions on terms with respect
to an equational theory describing their properties.
The attacker has complete control of the network,
except the private channels: he can eavesdrop, re-
move, substitute, duplicate and delay messages that
the parties are sending one another, and insert mes-
sages of his choice on the public channels (like the
Dolev-Yao attacker (Dolev and Yao, 1983)). To cap-
ture threats due to collusions and coercions, we as-
sume dishonest parties. They cooperate with the at-
tacker, revealing their secret data (e.g., secret keys) to
him, or taking orders from him (e.g., how to answer
a question). We model such dishonest parties as in
Definition 8 from (Delaune et al., 2006b): if the pro-
cess P is an honest party, then the process P c1,c2 is
its dishonest version. This is a variant of P which
shares with the attacker channels c1 and c2. Through
c1, P c1,c2 sends all its inputs and freshly generated
names (but not other channel names). From c2, P c1,c2
receives messages that can influence its behaviour.
For more details about the applied pi-calculus, its stan-
dard results and all the definitions used in this paper,
we remind to the papers (Abadi and Fournet, 2001;
Delaune et al., 2006b). An e-exam system involves
different parties, among which are the candidates who
sit for the exam; the examiners who mark the answers
submitted by the candidates; the question committee,
which prepare the exam questions; the exam authori-
ties, which conducts the exam, that is registrars, invig-
ilators, exam collectors, and a notification committee.
In some protocols, an authority can be responsible of
two or more roles.
Definition 1. (E-exam protocol). An e-exam pro-
tocol is a tuple (C,E,Q,A1, . . . , Al, n˜p), where C
is the process executed by the candidates, E is the
process executed by the examiners, Q is the process
executed by the question commitee, Ai’s are the pro-
cesses executed by the authorities, and n˜p is the set of
private channel names.
Note that all candidates and all examiners execute
the same process, but with different variable values,
e.g., keys, identities, and answers.
Definition 2. (E-exam instance). Given an e-exam
protocol an e-exam instance is a closed process
EP = νn˜.(Cσid1σa1 | . . . |Cσidjσaj |Eσid′1σm1 | . . .|Eσid′kσmk |Qσq|A1σdist | . . . |Al), where n˜ is the set
of all restricted names, which includes the set of the
protocol’s private channels; Cσidiσai ’s are the pro-
cesses run by the candidates, the substitutions σidi
and σai specify the identity and the answers of the i
th
candidate respectively; Eσid′iσmi ’s are the processes
run by the examiners, the substitution σid′i speci-
fies the ith examiner’s identity, and σmi specifies for
each possible question/answer pair the correspond-
ing mark; Q is the process run by the question com-
mittee, the substitution σq specifies the exam ques-
tions; the Ai’s are the processes run by the exam au-
thorities, the substitution σdist determines which an-
swers will be submitted to which examiners for grad-
ing. Without loss of generality, we assume that A1 is
in charge of distributing the copies to the examiners.
Definition 2 does not specify whether the examin-
ers are machines or humans. For the purpose of our
model this distinction is not necessary; it is sufficient
that an examiner attributes a mark to a given answer.
Note that Q and A1 could coincide if for instance
there is only one authority A, in that case we can
write simply Aσqσdist instead of Qσq|A1σdist . We
organize an e-exam’s steps in four phases. (1) Reg-
istration: the exam authority (the registrar) creates a
new examination and checks the eligibility of candi-
dates who attempts to register for it. (2) Examina-
tion: the exam authority authenticates the candidates,
and sends to each of them an exam form that contains
the exam questions. Each candidate fills the form
with his answer, and submits it to the exam collec-
tor. (3) Marking: the authority distributes the forms
submitted by the candidates to the examiners, who in
their turn evaluate and mark them; (4) Notification:
once the forms have been evaluated, the marks are no-
tified to the candidates.
3 SECURITY PROPERTIES
We propose a formalization for authentication and
privacy properties. They best represent exam security
requirements as corroborated by other works (Furnell
et al., 1998; Giustolisi et al., 2013; Weippl, 2005).
We introduce four authentication properties meant
to ensure the associations between the candidate’s
identity, the answer, and the mark being preserved
through all phases. When authentication holds there
is no loss, no injection, and in general no manipula-
tion of the exam forms from examination to notifica-
tion. We also introduce five privacy properties that en-
sure the anonymity of critical parties in order to pre-
vent bribing, favouritisms, and to guarantee fairness
among candidates. In the context of e-exams, there
are other classes of properties that might be of inter-
est, such as verifiability, reliability, or accountability,
but we do not study them here. We leave this task as
future work.
3.1 Authentication properties
We model our authentication properties as correspon-
dence properties, a well-known approach (Ryan et al.,
2000; Ryan and Smyth, 2011). Specific events, whose
parameters refer to the pieces of information in the
exam form, flag important steps in the execution of
the exam. Events are annotations that do not change
a process behavior, but are inserted at precise loca-
tions to allow reasoning about the exam’s execution.
In the following id c is the candidate identity, ques
the question(s), ans the answer(s), mark the mark(s),
id form is an identifier of the exam form used during
marking, and id e is the examiner’s identity.
• reg(id c): is the event inserted into the registrar
process at the location where candidate id c has
successfully registered for the exam.
• submitted(id c, ques, ans): is the event inserted
into the process of candidate id c in the exami-
nation phase, at the location where he sends his
answer ans corresponding to the question ques .
• collected(id c, ques, ans): is the event inserted
into the exam collector’s process in the examina-
tion phase, just after it received and accepted the
exam form (id c, ques , ans) from candidate id c.
• distrib(id c, ques, ans, id form, id e): is the
event inserted into the authority process in the
marking phase, when it assigns the exam form
(id c, ques, ans) from candidate id c to the ex-
aminer id e using the identifier id form .
• marked(ques, ans,mark , id form, id e): is the
event inserted into the examiner id e’s process
in the marking phase, at the location where
he marked the question/answer pair (ques, ans)
identified by id form with the mark mark .
• notified(id c,mark): is the event inserted into
the process of candidate id c in the notification
phase, just after he received and accepted the
mark mark from the responsible authority.
Note that the id form is only used to identify an exam
form during marking. This could be a pseudonym to
allow anonymous marking, or simply the candidate
identity if the marking is not anonymous. In exam
with only one examiner the event distrib might ap-
pear to be unnecessary. Yet, it is needed. It links
exam forms to id form and, for instance, helps re-
vealing when identical answers are graded multiple
times (and not necessarily with the same mark).
Our events allow us to express authentication
properties as correspondence properties, all having
the following structure: “on every trace the event e1
is preceded by the event e2”. The first authentication
property is Answer Origin Authentication and con-
cerns both the registration and examination phases. It
ensures that only one exam form from each candidate
and only the forms submitted by eligible candidates
(registered) are actually collected.
Definition 3 (Answer Origin Authentication). An e-
exam protocol ensures Answer Origin Authentication
if, for every e-exam process EP , each occurrence of
the event collected(id c, ques, ans) is preceded by a
distinct occurrence of the event reg(id c) on every
execution trace.
At examination phase, each candidate submits his
exam form with an answer, and the collector collects
the forms. Form Authorship ensures that the contents
of each collected exam form (id c, ques , and ans) are
not modified after submission.
Definition 4 (Form Authorship). An e-exam pro-
tocol ensures Form Authorship if, for every e-
exam process EP , each occurrence of the event
collected(id c, ques, ans) is preceded by a distinct
occurrence of the event submitted(id c, ques, ans)
on every execution trace.
Similarly, Form Authenticity ensures that the con-
tent of each exam form is not modified after the col-
lection and until after the form is marked by an exam-
iner.
Definition 5 (Form Authenticity). An e-exam
protocol ensures Form Authenticity if, for ev-
ery e-exam process EP , each occurrence of
the event marked(ques, ans,mark , id form, id e)
is preceded by a distinct occurrence of the
events distrib(id c, ques, ans, id form, id e) and
collected(id c, ques, ans) on every execution trace.
At notification phase, the candidate should receive
the mark which was assigned by the examiner to his
answer. We call this property Mark Authenticity.
Definition 6 (Mark Authenticity). An e-
exam protocol ensures Mark Authenticity if,
for every e-exam process EP , each occur-
rence of the event notified(id c,mark) is pre-
ceded by a distinct occurrence of the events
marked(ques, ans,mark , id form, id e) and
distrib(id c, ques, ans, id form, id e) on every
execution trace.
Note that Mark Authenticity ensures that the can-
didate is notified with the mark delivered by the ex-
aminer on the answer assigned to him by the author-
ity. This answer may be different from that submitted
by the candidate. Only if also Form Authorship and
Form Authenticity hold then the candidate can be sure
that the assigned and submitted answers are identical.
Mark Authenticity does not guarantee that the mark is
computed correctly.
3.2 Privacy properties
We model our privacy properties as observational
equivalence, a standard choice for such kind of prop-
erties (Ryan and Schneider, 2001; Ryan and Smyth,
2011). We use the labeled bisimilarity (≈l) to ex-
press the equivalence between two processes (Abadi
and Fournet, 2001). Informally, two processes are
equivalent if an observer has no way to tell them apart.
As a notation, we use what in applied pi-calculus
is called “context”. The context EPI [ ] is the pro-
cess EP without the identities in the set I; they
are replaced by “holes”. We use it when we
need to specify exactly the processes for candi-
dates id1 and id2 without repeating the entire e-
exam instance. This is done by rewriting EP as
EP{id1,id2}[Cσid1σa1 |Cσid2σa2 ]. Notation EP |e
denotes the process EP without the code that follows
the event e. The first privacy property says questions
are kept secret until the exam starts.
Definition 7 (Question Indistinguishability). An e-
exam protocol ensures Question Indistinguishability
if for any e-exam process EP that ends with the reg-
istration phase, any questions q1 and q2, we have that:
EP{idQ}[Qσq1 ]|reg ≈l EP{idQ}[Qσq2 ]|reg .
Question Indistinguishability states that two pro-
cesses with different questions have to be observa-
tionally equivalent until the end of the registration
phase. This prevents the attacker from obtaining in-
formation about the exam questions before the ex-
amination phase starts. This property requires the
question committee to be honest; otherwise the prop-
erty is trivially violated since the committee reveals
the questions to the attacker. However, it is partic-
ularly interesting to consider dishonest candidates,
as they might be interested in obtaining the ques-
tions in advance. We can do this by replacing
honest candidates with dishonest ones. For exam-
ple, if we assume that candidate id1 is dishonest,
we obtain EP{id1,idQ}[(Cσid1σa1)
c1,c2 |Qσq1 ]|reg≈l
EP{id1,idQ}[(Cσid1σa1)
c1,c2 |Qσq2 ]|reg .
The next property ensures that the marking pro-
cess is done anonymously, i.e., that two instances
where candidates swap their answers cannot be dis-
tinguished until after the end of the marking phase.
This may be desirable to ensure fairness of the grad-
ing, and is a requirement in some exam settings (at
some universities or for competitive examinations).
Definition 8 (Anonymous Marking). An e-exam
protocol ensures Anonymous Marking if for any
e-exam process EP that ends with the marking
phase, any two candidates id1 and id2, and any two
answers a1 and a2, we have that:
EP{id1,id2}[Cσid1σa1 |Cσid2σa2 ]|mark≈l
EP{id1,id2}[Cσid1σa2 |Cσid2σa1 ]|mark .
Anonymous Marking ensures that the process
where id1 answers a1 and id2 answers a2 is equiv-
alent to the process where id1 answers a2 and id2
answers a1. This prevents the attacker to obtain the
identity of the candidate who submitted a certain an-
swer before the marking phase ends. For this prop-
erty, it is interesting to consider dishonest examiners.
It can be done using the same technique employed
for dishonest candidates outlined above. We can also
have some dishonest candidates, however the candi-
dates id1 and id2 who are assigned the two different
answers have to be honest – otherwise the property
can be trivially violated by one of them revealing his
answer to the attacker.
To prevent bribing or coercion of the examiners, it
might be interesting to ensure their anonymity, so that
no candidate knows which examiner marked his copy.
Definition 9 (Anonymous Examiner). An e-
exam protocol ensures Anonymous Examiner
if for any e-exam process EP , any two can-
didates id1, id2, any two examiners id
′
1, id
′
2,
and any two marks m1, m2, we have that:
EP{id1,id2,id′1,id′2,idA1}[Cσid1σa1 |Cσid2σa2 |
Eσid′1σm1 |Eσid′2σm2 |A1σdist1 ] ≈l
EP{id1,id2,id′1,id′2,idA1}[Cσid1σa1 |Cσid2σa2 |
Eσid′1σm2 |Eσid′2σm1 |A1σdist2 ] where σdist1 at-
tributes the exam form of candidate id1 to examiner
id ′1 and the exam form of candidate id2 to examiner
id ′2, and σdist2 attributes the exam form of candidate
id1 to examiner id
′
2 and the exam form of candidate
id2 to examiner id
′
1.
Anonymous Examiner ensures that a process in
which examiner id ′1 grades the exam form of candi-
date id1 and examiner id ′2 grades that of candidate
id2 cannot be distinguished from a process in which
id ′1 grades the exam form of id2 and id
′
2 grades that
of id1. Note that to ensure that in both cases the
candidates receive the same mark, we also have to
swap σm1 and σm2 between the examiners. Similar
to Anonymous Marking, this property prevents the at-
tacker to obtain or guess the identity of the examiner
who marked a certain answer. Anonymous Examiner
requires that the examiners id′1 and id
′
2 are honest,
otherwise it will trivially violated by one of them re-
vealing the mark he gave. We can again include dis-
honest candidates as they might be interested in find-
ing out which examiner marked their copies.
In some exams settings the marks have to remain
private. This is formalized in the next property.
Definition 10 (Mark Privacy). An e-exam proto-
col ensures Mark Privacy if for any e-exam pro-
cess EP , any marks m1, m2, we have that:
EP{id′}[Eσid′σm1 ] ≈l EP{id′}[Eσid′σm2 ].
Mark Privacy guarantees that two processes
where the examiner id′1 assigns for the same answer,
entailed by the same context EP , two different marks
m1,m2, cannot be distinguished from each other. De-
pending on the exam policy this can be an optional
property since some exams system may publicly dis-
close the marks of the candidates. However, the intu-
ition here is that candidate’s performance should not
be known to any other candidate. Again, we can as-
sume that some candidates are dishonest and try to
find out the marks of their colleagues, or that an ex-
aminer tries to find out the mark achieved by a can-
didate. The candidate who is assigned the two differ-
ent marks has to be honest – otherwise the property
is violated by him revealing his mark to the attacker.
Similarly the examiner assigning the marks has to be
honest, otherwise he can reveal the mark himself.
The previous definition of Mark Privacy ensures
that the attacker cannot know the mark of a candidate.
A weaker variant of Mark Privacy is Mark Anonymity,
i.e., the attacker might know the list of all marks, but
is unable to associate a mark to its corresponding can-
didate. This is often the case in practice, where a list
of pseudonyms (e.g., student numbers) and marks is
published.
Definition 11 (Mark Anonymity). An e-exam
protocol ensures Mark Anonymity if for any e-exam
process EP , any candidates id1, id2, any examiner
id′1, any answers a1, a2 and a distribution σdist that
assigns the answers of both candidates to the exam-
iner, and two substitutions σma and σmb which are
identical, except that σma attributes the mark m1 to
the answer a1 and m2 to a2, whereas σmb attributes
m2 to the answer a1 and m1 to a2, we have that:
EP{id1,id2,id′1,idA1}[Cσid1σa1 |Cσid2σa2 |Eσid′1σma|A1σdist] ≈l EP{id1,id2,id′1,idA1}[Cσid1σa1 |Cσid2σa2|Eσid′1σmb |A1σdist]
The definition states that if an examiner id′1, who
is assigned the same answers a1 and a2 as σdist is un-
changed, swaps the marks between these answers, the
two situations cannot be distinguished by the attacker.
This means that a list of marks can be public, but the
attacker must be unable to link the marks to the can-
didates. Again, we can consider dishonest parties, but
this definition requires the two concerned candidates
and the two concerned examiners to be honest. Other-
wise they can simply reveal the answer and the asso-
ciated mark, which allows to distinguish both cases.
It is also easy to see that a protocol ensuring Mark
Privacy also ensures Mark Anonymity. In fact, σma
and σmb are special cases of σm1 and σm2 .
4 Huszti & Petho˝ PROTOCOL
We first analyze the Huszti & Petho˝ proto-
col (Huszti and Petho˝, 2010), which we call con-
cisely H&P protocol. It aims to ensure authenti-
cation and privacy for e-exams in presence of dis-
honest candidates, examiners and exam authorities.
The original paper also presents an informal secu-
rity analysis based on conjectures. Such conjectures
contribute to our motivation on the need of a frame-
work for the formal analysis of e-exams. Notably, all
the messages within the H&P protocol are sent via a
reusable anonymous return channel (RARC) (Golle
and Jakobsson, 2003) to achieve privacy properties.
A RARC implements anonymous4 two-way con-
versations. It allows the party that initiates the pro-
tocol to send an anonymous message to a recipient.
The recipient can reply without learning the sender’s
identity, but knowing that his reply will be dispatched
to the actual sender. The entire conversation re-
mains untraceable to an external attacker. A RARC
is implemented by a re-encryption mixnet. The mix
servers jointly generate and share an ElGamal key
pair (PKMIX , SKMIX ) and a pair of public/private
signing keys (SPKMIX , SSKMIX ). The sender A
and the receiver B also hold ElGamal public/private
key pairs, (PKA, SKA) and (PKB , SKB) respec-
tively. A and B are represented by IDA and IDB ,
identity tags which can be for example A’s and B’s
email addresses.
4Note that although the original security definition re-
quires anonymity of the messages, it does not require se-
crecy of the messages.
To send the message m to B, the agent A submits
to the mixnet the tuple Mix (m,A,B) that denotes
({IDA,PKA}PKMIX , {m}PKMIX , {IDB , PKB}PKMIX )
and proves knowledge of {IDA,PKA} and of
{IDB ,PKB}. The proofs are meant to avoid that
the attacker decrypts the triplet content by using the
mixnet as a decryption oracle (in Section 4.2 we
prove this claim to be false considering a Dolev-Yao
threat model). The mixnet waits to collect more
triplets and then shuffles them. Then, it adds a check-
sum to the triplets in order to guarantee their integrity
while they are shuffled, yet this provides no end-
to-end integrity protection. The message m is then
re-encrypted with the public key of B using a switch-
ing encryption keys technique. The mixnet signs the
encrypted public key of A. Thus B receives the pair
(sign({IDA,PKA}PKMIX ,SKMIX ), {m}PKB )
where sign(x, sk) is message x plus the signa-
ture with the secret key sk. Then B replies to A
with a new message m′ by sending to the mixnet
(Mix (m′, B,A), sign({IDA,PKA}PKMIX ,SKMIX ))
and proving only knowledge of {IDB ,PKB}. The
mixnet checks the proof and the signature, and then
processes the tuples like a normal message.
4.1 Protocol Description
We use ProVerif to verify the protocol. The ProVerif
model is based on the description presented in orig-
inal paper (Huszti and Petho˝, 2010). Here we only
give an overview of the protocol.
The H&P protocol relies upon different crypto-
graphic building blocks. The ElGamal cryptosys-
tem (Elgamal, 1985) is used to provide parties
with public/private key pairs. A RARC implements
anonymous two-way communication. A network
of servers provides a timed-release service (NET),
which contributes to create and revoke the candi-
date’s pseudonym. More precisely, their contribution
to the pseudonym is shared among the servers using
the threshold Shamir secret sharing system (Shamir,
1979). At notification, a subset of the NET servers
can use their shares to recover the secret and de-
anonymize the pseudonym of the candidate. Then, the
exam authority can associate the answer with the cor-
responding candidate. To avoid plagiarism, the proto-
col assumes that no candidate reveals its private key to
another candidate and that invigilators supervise can-
didates during the examination. We describe the pro-
tocol in five phases, distinguishing the examiner and
the candidate registration. However, according to our
model, the two registration (sub-)phases are merged
into a single phase.
Examiner Registration: The exam authority pub-
lishes the public parameters to identify a new exami-
nation. The question committee then signs and sends
the questions and the starting time of the phases en-
crypted with the public key of the RARC mixnet. The
mixnet forwards the message only when the exami-
nation begins. The examiner is then provided with a
pseudonym, which is jointly generated by the exam
authority and the examiner. The examiner verifies
the correctness of the pseudonym by using a zero-
knowledge proof (ZKP). Then, the examiner sends
his pseudonym to the exam authority, and proves the
knowledge of his secret key.
Candidate Registration: The registration of a can-
didate slightly differs from the registration of an ex-
aminer. The candidate pseudonym is jointly calcu-
lated by the exam authority, the candidate, and also
the NET to provide anonymity for the candidates. The
NET stores the secret values used for the pseudonym
generation, which can be used to de-anonymize the
candidate after the examination has finished. Again,
the candidate finally verifies the correctness of his
pseudonym using a ZKP.
Examination: The candidate sends his pseudonym
via the RARC to the exam authority and proves the
knowledge of his private key. Then, the exam author-
ity checks whether the candidate is registered for the
examination, and sends him the questions signed by
the question committee. The candidate sends his an-
swer, again via the RARC. The exam authority replies
with a receipt which consists of the hash of all param-
eters seen by the exam authority during the examina-
tion, the transcription of the ZKPs, and the time when
the answer was submitted.
Marking: The exam authority chooses an exam-
iner who is eligible for the examination, and forwards
him the answer via the RARC. Then the examiner as-
signs a mark to the answer, and authenticates them
using a ZKP.
Notification: When all the answers are marked,
the NET de-anonymizes the pseudonyms linked to the
answers, and the exam authority stores the marks.
4.2 Formal Analysis
The equational theory depicted in Table 1 models the
cryptographic primitives used within the H&P pro-
tocol. The equational theory includes well-known
models for probabilistic encryption and digital signa-
tures. Inspired by Backes et al. (Backes et al., 2008b),
we model the ZKP of knowledge of a secret expo-
nent as two functions, proof and verification. The
proof function zkp proof (public, secret) takes as ar-
guments a secret and public parameters (i.e. the ex-
ponent and the generator to the power of the expo-
nent). It can be constructed only by the prover who
knows the secret parameter. The verification function
zkpsec(zkp proof (public, secret), verinfo) takes as
arguments the proof function and the verification pa-
rameter verinfo. The verifier only accepts the proof
if the relation between verinfo and secret is satis-
fied. However, we support the model for the ZKP
of the equality of discrete logarithms zkp proof with
tables in ProVerif. This is due to the difficulties of
ProVerif when dealing with associativity of multiple
exponents, which is used in the H&P protocol. We
also assume the same generator is used for generat-
ing the pseudonyms of candidates and examiners, in
order to avoid non-termination in ProVerif. This is
sound because we distinguish the roles, and each prin-
cipal is identified by its public key. We replace the
candidate identity with his corresponding pseudonym
inside the events to check authentication properties.
We note that the replacement is also sound because
the equational theory preserves the bijective mapping
between the keys that identify the candidate and his
pseudonym.
decrypt(encrypt(m, pk(k), r), k) = m
getmess(sign(m, k)) = m
checksign(sign(m, k), pk(k)) = m
exp(exp(g, x), y) = exp(exp(g, y), x)
checkproof (xproof (p, p1, g, exp(g, e), e),
p, p1, g, exp(g, e)) = true
zkpsec(zkp proof(exp(b, e), e), exp(b, e)) = true
Table 1: Equational theory to model H&P protocol
First we analyzed the RARC alone and found an
attack on anonymity and privacy, which is detailed in
the next paragraph. We then replaced the RARC with
an implementation of a secure RARC using honest
parties to check if the protocol ensures some proper-
ties given a working anonymous channel. In this case,
ProVerif terminates for all properties on H&P5.
The result of the verification together with the
time required for ProVerif to conclude on a standard
PC (Intel i7, 8GB RAM), are summed up in Table 2.
Attack on RARC: ProVerif shows that the RARC
fails to guarantee both secrecy of messages and
anonymity of sender and receiver identities, which is
its main purpose inside the H&P protocol. We refer
the triplet 〈c1, c2, c3〉 as the encrypted messages that
A submits to the mixnet when she wants to send a
5All ProVerif codes are available on line
http://apsia.uni.lu/stast/codes/exams/
proverif_code_secrypt.tar.gz
Property Result Time
Answer Origin Authentication × < 1 s
Form Authorship × < 1 s
Form Authenticity × < 1 s
Mark Authenticity × < 1 s
Question Indistinguishability × < 1 s
Anonymous Marking × 8 m 46 s
Anonymous Examiner × 9 m 8 s
Mark Privacy × 39 m 8 s
Mark Anonymity × 1h 15 m 58 s
Table 2: Summary of our analysis on the formal model of
the H&P protocol.
message to B. From the description of RARC given
at the beginning of this section, we recall that c1 en-
crypts the A’s public key, c2 encrypts the message to
B, and c3 encrypts the B’s public key. All cipher-
texts are encrypted with the mixnet’s public key.
The attacker in control of the network can use
the RARC as a decryption oracle, letting the RARC
reveal any of the plaintexts. The attack works as
follows. The attacker chooses one of the three ci-
phertexts (depending on whether he wants to tar-
get the contents of the message, or the identities of
the sender and receiver) and submits this as a new
message. For example, if the attacker targets c1 =
{IDA, PKA}PKMIX , he resubmits c1 as a new en-
crypted message, which means that c′2 = c1 in the
new triplet. He can leave the encryption of the senders
key and the proof concerning the key unchanged, but
replaces the encryption of the receiver’s key with a
public key PKI for which he knows the correspond-
ing secret key SKI . In our example this means
c′3 = {IDI , PKI}PKMIX . The attacker can also pro-
vide the necessary proof of knowledge of plaintext,
since he knows this plaintext.
The RARC then mixes the input messages, and
sends the encryption of the message under the re-
ceiver’s public key to the receiver. In our example
the attacker receives {IDA, PKA}PK I . Since the at-
tacker knows the secret key SKI he can obtain the
original message. In our example he gets IDA, the
identity of the sender which should have remained
anonymous. Since the attacker can substitute any of
the items in the triplet as the new message, the RARC
does neither ensure secrecy of the messages nor the
anonymity of the sender or the receiver. Note that
the checksum meant to guarantee the integrity of the
triplet is only added after the submission of the mes-
sage and is only used inside the mixnet. Hence, the
checksum does not prevent the attacker from submit-
ting a modified triplet. Even if it were added before, it
would not prevent the attack as the knowledge of the
ciphertexts is sufficient to compute the checksum.
Note that the RARC was originally designed to
withstand a passive attacker, which however is al-
lowed to statically corrupt parties. We argue that this
is not realistic in the e-exam setting where dishonest
parties could try to cheat. Moreover, even static cor-
ruption is sufficient to carry out the attack outlined
above: one dishonest party that can send and receive
messages via the RARC is sufficient. Also, he has
to intercept the message before it enters the RARC,
but this is difficult to prevent in a normal unsecured
network such as the Internet.
Authentication properties: We verified the au-
thentication properties modelling the RARC as an
ideal anonymous (yet not secret, according to the
original security definition) channel. Note that the
following attacks also remain valid if the protocol
adopts the RARC.
ProVerif finds an attack on Answer Origin Au-
thentication where the attacker can create a fake
pseudonym that allows him to take part in an exam
for which he did not registered. This is possible be-
cause the exam authority does not check whether the
pseudonym has been actually created using the par-
tial information provided by the time-release service.
The attacker generates his own secret key SKA, and
calculates an associate pseudonym, which sends to
the exam authority. The exam authority successfully
verifies the received data and that the attacker knows
SKA, thus the exam authority accepts the answer.
Form Authorship fails due to the same attack: in fact,
the exam authority may collects an exam form which
is modified by changing the pseudonym to a one cho-
sen by the attacker.
ProVerif also shows that the H&P protocol does
not ensure Form Authenticity, because there is no
mechanism that allows the examiner to check whether
the answers have been forwarded by the exam author-
ity. Even if the original RARC is used and the answer
is encrypted with the public key of the mixnet, this
does not guarantee that the exam authority actually
sent the message.
ProVerif provides a similar attack for Mark Au-
thenticity. In fact, the attacker can forward any an-
swer to any examiner, even if the answer was not col-
lected by the exam authority. Morevoer, the attacker
can notify the candidate by himself with a mark of his
choice.
Privacy properties: ProVerif finds an attack on
Question Indistinguishability. This is because the at-
tack on the RARC exposes the message and the iden-
tities of the sender and receiver. As the questions
are sent through the RARC, the attacker can obtain
them. Moreover, as the candidate’s answer is also
sent through the RARC, the protocol does not ensure
Anonymous Marking: the answer can be linked to its
corresponding sender. The protocol ensures neither
Mark Privacy nor Anonymous Examiner, as the marks
are also sent through the RARC. Hence, they can be
decrypted and the examiner can be identified.
We checked the H&P protocol in ProVerif assum-
ing correct RARC (i.e. ensuring anonymity, but no
secrecy). Also in this case ProVerif shows an at-
tack for each property. Anonymous Examiner can
be violated because the attacker can track which ex-
aminer accepts the ZKP when receiving the partial
pseudonym, and then associate to the examiner the
answer that the latter grades. Moreover, a similar at-
tack on Anonymous Marking remains: the attacker
can check whether a candidate accepts the ZKP to
associate him with a pseudonym, and then identify
his answer. Finally, neither Mark Privacy nor Mark
Anonymity are ensured because the examiner sends
the mark to the exam authority in clear.
To sum up, the H&P protocol ensures no proper-
ties at all, and ProVerif discovers attacks. While the
authentication properties fail due to a weak protocol
design, the privacy properties fail because of an in-
appropriate use of the RARC, which was neither de-
signed to ensure secrecy nor to withstand active at-
tackers. Moreover, we identified flaws in the RARC
even in a static corruption setting, and in the H&P
protocol assuming a correct anonymous channel.
5 Remark! PROTOCOL
We first give the protocol presented in (Giustolisi
et al., 2014) and then the results of our analysis.
5.1 Protocol Description
The Remark! protocol has the same set of parties
of the H&P protocol, but relies on a different ap-
proach. The NET is indeed several servers that im-
plement an exponentiation mixnet (Haenni and Spy-
cher, 2011). The speciality of exponentiation mixnets
is that each server blinds its entries by a common ex-
ponent value. On entry X , the mixnet outputs Xr
where r is the product of the secret exponent values
of the servers. At registration, the NET creates the
pseudonyms for the candidates and examiners without
involving any of them. The pseudonyms are eventu-
ally used as public-key encryption and signature ver-
ification keys in such a way to allow parties to com-
municate anonymously. A bulletin board6 is used to
6A public append-only memory.
publish the pseudonyms, the test questions and the re-
ceipts of test submissions. The combination of the
exponentiation mixnet and a bulletin board allows the
protocol to not rely on a RARC as anonymous chan-
nel.
Remark! only assumes that each party is given a
pair of public/private key with a common generator
g, i.e. the private key x and the public key y = gx.
Below, we present the protocol within the four e-exam
phases.
Registration: The list of eligible candidates’ and
examiners’ public keys is sent as a batch to the NET.
The NET calculates the pseudonyms by raising the
initial public keys to a common value r =
∏
i ri.
More specifically, each mix server raises the input
message to a secret value ri, and forwards it to an-
other mix server. At the same time the NET blindly
permutes the batch of public keys. The so obtained
keys eventually become the pseudonyms for candi-
dates and examiners. Along with the pseudonyms
y′ = yr = (gx)r, the NET publishes a new gener-
ator h, which is the output of g raised to the product
of each mix server secret value, i.e. h = gr. Both
the candidates and the examiners can identify their
own pseudonyms by raising h to their secret key x,
i.e. hx = (gr)x. The pseudonyms from now on serve
as public encryption and signature verification keys.
Two different batches are used for candidates and ex-
aminers because only the identities of candidates are
revealed at notification.
Examination: The exam authority signs and
encrypts the test questions with the candidate’s
pseudonym and publishes them on the bulletin board.
Each candidate submits his answer, which is signed
with the candidate’s private key (but using the gen-
erator h instead of g) and encrypted with the public
key of the exam authority. The exam authority col-
lects the test answer, checks its signature using the
candidate’s pseudonym, re-signs it, and finally pub-
lishes its encryption with the corresponding candi-
date’s pseudonym as receipt.
Marking: The exam authority encrypts the signed
test answer with an eligible examiner pseudonym and
publishes the encryption on the bulletin board. The
corresponding examiner marks the test answer, and
signs it with his private key (again using the generator
h instead of g). The examiner then encrypts it with
the exam authority public key, and submits its marks
to the exam authority.
Notification: When the exam authority receives
all the candidate evaluations, it publishes the signed
marks, each encrypted with the corresponding can-
didate’s pseudonym. Then, the NET servers de-
anonymize the candidate’s pseudonyms by reveal-
checkpseudo(pseudo pub(pk(k), rce),
pseudo priv(k, exp(rce))) = true
decrypt(encrypt(m, pk(k), r), k) = m
decrypt(encrypt(m, pseudo pub(pk(k),
rce), r), pseudo priv(k, exp(rce))) = m
getmess(sign(m, k)) = m
checksign(sign(m, k), pk(k)) = m
checksign(sign(m, pseudo priv(k,
exp(rce))), pseudo pub(pk(k), rce)) = m
Table 3: Equational theory to model Remark! protocol
ing their secret exponents. Hence the candidate
anonymity is revoked, and the mark can finally be
registered. Note that the examiner’s secret exponent
is not revealed to ensure his anonymity even after the
exam concludes.
5.2 Formal Analysis
We analyze Remark! with ProVerif, following simi-
lar techniques as the one used in the analysis of the
H&P protocol. Table 4 sums up the results together
with the time required for ProVerif to conclude on the
same PC used for H&P. We model the bulletin board
as a public channel, and use the equational theory de-
picted in Table 3. The equations for encryption and
signatures are standard, but we also added the pos-
sibility of using the pseudonym keys to encrypt or
sign. The public pseudonym, which also serves as
exam form identifier, is obtained using the function
pseudo pub on the public key and the random expo-
nent. The function pseudo priv can be used to de-
crypt or sign messages, using the private key and the
new generator gr (modelled using the function exp)
as parameters. The function checkpseudo allows us
to check if a pseudonym corresponds to a given secret
key (or its pseudonym variant).
Authentication properties: Supposing an attacker
in control of the network and all parties to be honest,
we can successfully verify all authentication proper-
ties in ProVerif. For this, we replace the candidate
identity with the candidate’s pseudonym inside the
events. This is sound as each candidate is uniquely
identified by his keys, and there is a bijective mapping
between keys and pseudonyms by construction of the
equational theory (for a given random exponent).
We also verified the authentication properties con-
sidering dishonest parties. In this case, all properties
are guaranteed except Form Authenticity. The attack
trace shows that a dishonest candidate can pick the
examiner of his choice by re-encrypting the signed
receipt received from the exam authority. It means
that the candidate can influence the choice of the ex-
aminer who will correct his exam. As the protocol
description envisages an access control for publish-
ing into the bulletin board, a feature that we could not
code in ProVerif, we cannot claim this to be an attack
as the candidate may not be allowed to post on the
bulletin board. However, we demonstrate that with a
simple fix there is no need of access control policies
for publishing into the bulletin board. The fix consists
in making the intended pseudonym of an examiner ex-
plicit within the signature that designates the exam-
iner as evaluator of an exam. In doing so, the exam
authority’s signature within the receipt cannot be used
by a candidate to designate any examiner because the
receipt includes no examiner’s pseudonym. The exam
authority will only accept exam evaluations that con-
tain its signature on examiner’s pseudonym. Consid-
ering the fix, ProVerif confirms that Remark! guaran-
tees all the security properties including Form Authen-
ticity, even in presence of dishonest parties.
Privacy properties: All the privacy properties are
satisfied. For Question Indistinguishability, we only
assume the exam authority to be honest, and then con-
clude that the property holds. For Mark Privacy, we
assume only the concerned candidate and examiner,
as well as the exam authority, to be honest. All other
candidates and examiners are dishonest, and ProVerif
still concludes successfully. Note that this subsumes
a case with multiple honest candidates and examin-
ers, since a dishonest party can behave like an hon-
est party. This also implies that the protocol ensures
Mark Anonymity as noted above. For Anonymous Ex-
aminer, we assume only the examiners and the NET
to be honest. If the NET publishes the pseudonyms in
random order, ProVerif concludes successfully. Sim-
ilarly for Anonymous Marking, we assume only the
candidates and the NET to be honest. Again, if
the NET publishes the pseudonyms in random order,
ProVerif concludes successfully.
6 CONCLUSION
We define the first formal framework for the anal-
ysis of secure e-exam protocols. We show how to
model e-exam protocols in the applied pi-calculus,
and define nine relevant security properties: four au-
thentication properties and five privacy properties.
Using ProVerif, we analyze the security of two
e-exam protocols. The first protocol has only been
argued to be secure. Our analysis shows that it in-
Property Result Time
Answer Origin Authentication X < 1 s
Form Authorship X < 1 s
Form Authenticity X∗ < 1 s
Mark Authenticity X < 1 s
Question Indistinguishability X < 1 s
Anonymous Marking X 2 s
Anonymous Examiner X 1 s
Mark Privacy X 3 m 32 s
Table 4: Summary of our analysis on the formal model of
the Remark! protocol. (∗) Form Authenticity fails with dis-
honest candidate. It holds after applying our fix.
deed satisfies none of the nine properties. Authenti-
cation is compromised because of inaccuracies in the
protocol design, whereas most of attacks invalidating
privacy exploit attacks on the RARC. These attacks
compromise secrecy and anonymity of the messages,
and exploit the absence of a proof of knowledge of
the submitted message to the RARC, which allows
its use as a decryption oracle. Such a proof is not
explicitly required in the original specification of the
RARC, and is certainly missing in the H&P protocol:
the “exam authority” is required to forward questions
and answers without knowing them, and thus cannot
prove knowledge of them when submitting them to
the RARC. Even when assuming a perfect RARC en-
suring anonymity, we still have attacks on all proper-
ties. Thus, we think that fixing the RARC is not suf-
ficient – the protocol requires fundamental changes.
Also Remark!, the second protocol analyzed, has
been only informally argued to be secure in the orig-
inal paper. It presents a weakness concerning Form
Authenticity. We propose a fix and formally verify
that the (fixed) protocol satisfies all the properties
herein considered.
Generally speaking, our framework and our anal-
ysis bring e-exams into the attention of the security
community. E-exams and in general computer-based
assessment tools are becoming widespread, some of
them supported by e-learning platforms such as the
massive open online courses (MOOC). Nevertheless,
they call for being formally proved secure, since most
of them have not been submitted to any rigorous se-
curity analysis. Such applications are complex and
exposed to unprecedented cheating attacks very sub-
tle to be discovered. We set the first research step on
the formal understanding of such systems and estab-
lishes a framework for the automatic analysis of their
security properties.
As a future work we intend to analyze more pro-
tocols designed for computer-based tests although ob-
taining protocol’s specifications from the providers is
not an easy task. Other interesting research works in-
clude the study of the relation between our security
properties as well as the definition of novel properties
such as verifiability, reliability, and accountability.
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